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1. Introduction
The concept of legal validity is regarded within the dominant  legal-
positivistic  account of law as a non-gradable concept: a legal rule is
either valid or non-valid. However, this account of validity is critici-
zed by some scholars for being too strict and rigid. Apparently, an
attractive alternative might be Alf Rosss account of validity as a pro-
babilistic concept. Ross assumed that the stronger predictions of judi-
cial behavior a given rule generates, the higher probability can be as-
signed to its being valid. This conception is usually called predictive
but it may be just as well be called probabilistic: according to Ross,
assertions about legal validity of rules are probabilistic, and they are
probabilistic precisely because legal rules are a basis for (uncertain)
predictions of future judicial decisions. However, as we shall see, this
account of legal validity is by no means uncontroversial. In the paper
we formulate several objections against it. Our discussion of these
objections will be preceded by a detailed presentation of Rosss con-
ception of validity.
2. Presentation of Rosss conception of validity
Rosss theory of legal validity as a probabilistic concept is an answer
to what is considered to be the dominant problem of jurisprudence.
Following Kelsen, Ross observed that traditional legal philosophy con-
ceives law as an entity or phenomenon at the same time real and ide-
al, as a fact and validity. He claimed that legal theorists maintained
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that that the concept valid law refers not only to some factual pheno-
mena, but also to the metaphysical validity stemming from, for in-
stance, rational nature of man or divine reason. He argued that such
dualism leads to a series of antinomies in legal thought, which he tra-
ced and preliminarily resolved in his book Towards a Realistic Juri-
sprudence. In this book Ross proposed that the two elements, i.e., re-
ality and validity of law, are not irreconcilable but, on the right
interpretation, constitute two aspects of the same phenomenon. He
contended that the concept of validity can be easily explained by me-
ans of science, without recourse to metaphysics, as it is in fact an ele-
ment of reality. In his view, propositions concerning valid law must be
interpreted as referring to a specific type of social facts which are de-
cisions of the courts. He claimed that the scientific procedure that is
supposed to confer meaning upon the doctrinal assertions about valid
law is the procedure of verification. Accordingly, if a tested doctrinal
assertion cannot be verified it is devoid of meaning, and thus should
be excluded from the scientific doctrinal study of law. The scientific
legal doctrine, as understood by Ross, is built of cognitive proposi-
tions, which are not norms but assertions concerning the norms  and
these assertions are to the effect that a certain norm has a character
of valid law. Thus for Ross the doctrinal study of law is normative,
but in the sense of being norm-descriptive rather than norm-expressi-
ve. More precisely, he claimed that the doctrinal assertion that A is
valid law does not express the law, but () is a prediction to the
effect that if an action in which the conditioning facts () are consi-
dered to exist is brought before the courts of this state, and in the
meantime there have been no alterations in the circumstances which
form the basis of A, the directive to the judge contained in the section
will form an integral part of the reasoning underlying the judgment
(Ross Alf. 1958. On Law and Justice. Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press. 42). Ross treated this kind of analysis of assertions about
validity as a an application of the method of verification; as he wrote,
a proposition about valid law is to be verified by fulfilling the prescri-
bed conditions and observing the decision (Ross A. op. cit. 41). Consi-
stently with his claim that assertions about legal validity are predic-
tions, he maintained that the statements concerning valid law always
refer to hypothetical judicial decisions in the future, arrived at under
certain conditions; as he put it: Valid law is never a historical fact
but a calculation with regard to the future (Ross A. op. cit.. 22), and,
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in a similar vein: () a statement concerning valid law at the pre-
sent moment does not refer to the past (Ross A. op. cit. 41). It is by no
means clear, however, whether Rosss assertion that valid law is ne-
ver a historical fact entails the claim that predictions should not be
based on the past judicial decisions. This seems to have been Rosss
claim, but it is controversial, even on his own assumptions (we shall
return to this problem in section 3). To return to our exposition of
Rosss conception: it bears stressing that the above-mentioned refe-
rence to the future is not targeted towards a result of a case. The
possibility of anticipating a future result does not have to indicate the
content of valid law. The legal scholar is to predict the rule on which
the judge will base his decision and not the decision itself. According
to Ross, such predictions of the future applications of the rules are
possible on the assumption of the existence of the common judicial
ideology, which motivates each single judge and animates his actions:
If () prediction is possible, it must be because the mental process by which
the judge decides to base his decision on one rule rather than another is not
a capricious and arbitrary matter, varying from one judge to another, but a pro-
cess determined by attitudes and concepts, a common normative ideology, pre-
sent and active in the minds of judges when they act in their capacity as judges.
It is true that we cannot observe directly what takes place in the mind of the
judge, but it is possible to construct hypotheses concerning it, and their value
can be tested simply by observing whether predictions based on them have
come true (Ross A. op. cit. 75).
The common normative ideology that forms a basis of doctrinal
predictions is shaped by the sources of law in the proper hierarchy.
Thus the normative ideology consists of directives, which do not de-
termine future judicial decisions, but are more like guidelines for the
judges, on the basis of which they can formulate final rules. Ross con-
ceived the sources of law as the aggregate of factors that underlie the
judges formulation of the rule on which he subsequently bases his
decision. Some of the sources provide the judge with a ready rule, while
others require interpretation. Ross proposed the following classifica-
tion of the sources of law depending on the degree of their, as he called
it, objectification: the fully objectivated source (legislation), the par-
tly objectivated source (custom, precedent) and the non-objectivated
source (reason). The mentioned objectification depends on whether
the source provides a judge with a ready rule or is merely an inspira-
tion, a material that requires interpretation. The variety of the sour-
ces of law results in the fact that predictions concerning valid law can
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never be considered as absolutely certain. Thus doctrinal assertions
about valid law can be probable to a greater or lesser degree depen-
ding on the basis on which they are made; as Ross claimed:
The probability is high, and the rule possesses a correspondingly
high degree of validity, if the prediction is based on the well-establi-
shed doctrine sustained by a continuous series of undisputed prece-
dents; or it is based on statutory provision whose interpretation has
been established in long and consistent practice. On the other hand,
the probability is low, and the rule has a correspondingly low degree
of validity, if the prediction is based on a single and dubious precedent
or even the principles or reason. Between the two extremes lies
a sliding scale of intermediate variations (Ross A. op. cit. 45).
Such a graded conception of validity is in stark opposition to the
dominant positivistic view according to which legal validity is consi-
dered to be an irreducible quality of a rule functioning in an all or
nothing manner, as it is derived form the superior norm. Such acco-
unt of legal validity can be found, for instance, in Kelsen  for whom
the norm is valid in relation to Grundnorm, and Hart  for whom the
rule is valid in relation to the rule of recognition. However, the law
valid in the positivistic sense need not be valid at all in Rosss (reali-
stic) sense or can be valid only to a slight degree: not all law is posi-
tive in the sense of »formally established« (Ross A. op. cit. 101). This
realistic sense can be most succinctly summarized as the recognition
in court practice; as Ross wrote:
In general it is assumed as a matter of course that a statute having been put
into proper form and duly promulgated is in itself valid law, that is, indepen-
dently of its subsequent application in the courts. Conversely, it is probably
rarely thought that what may be derived from reason could on these very
grounds have the character of valid law  only the recognition in court practice
invests the product of reason with such character (Ross A. op. cit. 101)
Rosss analyses led him to the conclusion that positivism, with its
absolute notion of validity shall be rejected, as it does not take into
account the variety of factors that form the basis of the common nor-
mative ideology. The alternative he proposed was the graded  proba-
bilistic  concept of legal validity, which allows including as the sour-
ces of law influencing judges decisions also those sources that were
excluded by legal positivists. Prior to passing to a critical analysis of
this concept, it is worth noticing that Ross used it with reference to
three objects, namely:
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(a) Doctrinal assertions:
If the doctrinal assertion that a certain rule is valid Danish law is, according to
its real content, a prediction that the rule will be applied in the future judicial
decisions, than it follows that assertions of this nature can never claim absolu-
te certainty, but can only be maintained with a greater or lesser degree of pro-
bability depending on the strength of the points on which the calculations abo-
ut the future rest (Ross A. op. cit.45).
(b) Rules of law:
() a rule can be valid to a greater or lesser degree varying with the degree of
probability with which it can be predicted that the rule will be applied. This
degree of probability depends on the material of experience on which the pre-
diction is built (sources of law) (Ross A. op. cit. 45).
(c) Sources of law:
To regard a statute in itself as law signifies that we can generally and with
a degree of probability bordering on certainty predict that it will be accepted by
the judge. Conversely, the rules derived form reason are not considered di-
rectly as law in themselves, because here we can do no more than guess the
reaction of the courts (Ross A. op. cit. 102).
However, this diversity of the usage of the concept of probabilistic
validity should not be regarded as Rosss inconsistency; it is clear that
it is a matter of convention whether one speaks about validity of rules
themselves or about the validity of legal assertions about them; and
given that the rules are derived from the sources of law, one can just
as well speak about the validity of the latter. It seems therefore that
he was justified in applying his probabilistic concept of validity, de-
pending on the kind of analysis he conducted, to doctrinal assertions
about law, rules of law, and sources of law. However, the account of
legal validity proposed by Ross is by no means uncontroversial. In the
next section we shall put it to a critical scrutiny.
3. Critique
Our critique will embrace four objections: the apparent gradability,
the problematic ascertainability, the normative insignificance of the
probabilistic information, and the neglecting of the normativity of le-
gal rules. We shall successively discuss these objections and analyze
their mutual relations.
(The objection of the apparent gradability) According to this objec-
tion Rosss probabilistic (and thereby gradable) account of legal vali-
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dity in fact presupposes a non-gradable account thereof. This is so
because in order to formulate predictions about the extent to which
a given rule will be invoked in judicial decisions, one must know be-
forehand what rules should be taken into account as (potentially) gro-
unding these predictions. It is precisely the positivistic concept of non-
gradable, formal validity that provides the criterion of a selection of
rules to be taken as bases of predictions. One can therefore say, if this
objection is apt, that the probabilistic concept of validity is partly para-
sitic on the formal concept thereof. We use the term partly because
this objection applies in its entirety only to the fully objectivated sour-
ces of law, namely the rules established by legislature, which arent the
only basis for Rossian predictions. The less objectivated source, e.g.,
custom, reason, traditions of culture, can also affect the shape of the
rule on which the judge bases his decision in a case at hand. However,
this reservation does not undermine our objection, as the main bases of
Rosss predictions are properly established, formally valid rules of law.
(The objection of the problematic ascertainability) One might pon-
der whether the account of validity as a probabilistic concept implies
that the assertions about legal validity are themselves probabilistic
or, rather, that probability is only a measure of confirmation of in fact
non-probabilistic assertions about legal validity. Ross is explicit in this
point: as it was mentioned in the previous section, he endorses the
view that assertions about legal validity are themselves probabilistic.
This implies that, for him, assertions of the type rule R is valid are
probabilistic, i.e., one can assign to them a certain value of probabili-
ty. Ross does not explain how the process of determining probabilistic
values is supposed to look like, but it seems that these values can be
determined in either of the following two ways:
(1) In the process of the empirical testing of initially non-probabi-
listic assertions about legal validity (they are initially treated as de-
prived of probabilistic values because, before this testing, the values
of probability are unknown); accordingly, the process of determining
probabilistic values of these assertions can schematically be presen-
ted in the following way:
Non-probabilistic assertion A: rule R is valid  testing its empirical consequ-
ences (predictions concerning the judges decisions)  the determination of the
probability of A  Probabilistic assertion A: rule R is valid to a probabilistic
degree p.
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(2) In the process of the revision, in the light of empirical evidence,
of subjectively probabilistic assertions about legal validity (the values
assigned to them are prior probabilities revised in the process of Bay-
esian reasoning); accordingly, the process of determining probabili-
stic values of these assertions can schematically be presented in the
following way:
Probabilistic assertion A: rule R is valid to a probabilistic degree p  revising
the value of p in the process of Bayesian reasoning Probabilistic assertion A:
rule R is valid to a probabilistic degree q.
On the first account, the probabilistic assertions about legal validi-
ty are of the frequentist character, on the second account  of the
subjective one.
However, the vexed question arises, irrespective which of these
two accounts was meant by Ross, of how one can ascertain the proba-
bilistic values of assertions of type A: the nature of empirical testing
which, according to Ross, is supposed to provide these values seems
rather mysterious. Ross believed that since assertions about legal va-
lidity are empirical they can be tested in the same manner as scienti-
fic hypotheses. But even granted his realistic assumption that asser-
tions about legal validity are empirical in character, it is very dubious
whether they can be tested just as scientific hypothesis: the analogy
between these two types of statements seems highly misleading in
this point. As regards scientific hypotheses, none of them can be defi-
nitively verified (confirmed), since the set of instances to which it ap-
plies, and thereby the set of instances, which may disconfirm it, is
virtually infinite; a scientific hypothesis can only be falsified (if at le-
ast one prediction implied by it will be inconsistent with empirical
facts). Now, if we wished to apply the method of empirical testing in
the same way as it is used in science to assertions about legal validity,
it would turn out that virtually all of these assertions would be di-
sconfirmed (falsified), since, for virtually each rule, one can find a si-
tuation in which it will not be applied. Thus, the application of the
scientific method of empirical testing to assertions about legal validi-
ty would lead to the conclusion that virtually all of these assertions
should be rejected, i.e., that virtually all legal rules fail to be valid. Of
course Ross does not endorse this absurd conclusion. But it means
that he uses a loose manner of speaking, when he draws an analogy
between testing doctrinal assertions about legal validity and scientific
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hypotheses: while the latter are rejected if they generate false predic-
tions, the former are almost always (with the rare exception when
virtually all predictions they generate are false) preserved.1 The loose
manner of speaking is not, however, the thrust of our objection. The
thrust is that Ross does not make precise how large must be the set of
(legally relevant) situations in which the assertions about legal validi-
ty of a given rule should be tested and whether the testing should be
limited to future judicial decisions or should also include the past ones.
As was mentioned in the previous section, Ross claimed that doctrinal
assertions concerning valid law at the present moment are predic-
tions, and therefore refer to the future, not to the past. But it is uncle-
ar whether he derived from this claim about the meaning of these
assertions the conclusion that the bases for these predictions should
not be based on the past judicial decisions. In our view, such a conclu-
sion would be untenable because, as it seems, among judicial deci-
sions underlying a probabilistic assessment of the validity of a given
rule, there must be some past ones (relative to the time the asses-
sment is made), unless we imagine an entirely abstract situation in
which a given rule is tested at some definite time t1, and only decisions
from the time interval t1  t2, are taken into account in determining
the probabilistic assessment of validity (which would then be relative
to t1). Thus, if one does not want to make the assertions about validity
time-relative, one cannot avoid treating past judicial decisions as fac-
tors determining these assertions. Furthermore, it would be rather
peculiar to claim that past decisions should be left out from the pro-
cess of assessing the probability values of assertions about legal vali-
dity; they seem to be an essential factor in determining the probabili-
stic values of these assertions. As we already mentioned, it is not clear
whether Ross endorsed this implausible conclusion or not. On the one
hand, his insistence on the claim that legal rules refer to the future
1 The analogy might be regarded as strict only if Rosss claim was that probabi-
listic assertions about legal validity should be empirically tested; in this case, none
of them, like none of probabilistic scientific hypotheses, could be  strictly spe-
aking  verified or falsified, since one can never exclude that in the long run the
proportion of judicial decisions based on a given rule and those not based on this
rule will converge to a probabilistic estimate of this rules validity. But it clear
that this was not his claim: when he says that a given rule provides a strong basis
for predictions he does not mean that the probabilistic assertion about the validity
of this rule is correct but that the probability of this assertion is high.
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might suggest that he did endorse this view. On the other hand, this
claim does not entail the conclusion that only future decisions matter
in assessing the probability of assertions about validity; furthermore,
while dealing with the problem of whether a rule which has not been
verified in judicial practice (because citizens commonly act in accor-
dance with it) is valid, he contends that such a rule can be considered
valid when all the facts point that it will form a basis for future judi-
cial decisions. But, clearly, such facts must be past ones. It should be
stressed, though, that solving the puzzle of whether only the future
judicial decisions, or also the past ones, should be taken into account
in making probability assessments does not weaken in any way our
objection; it is clear that probability values assigned to a given rules
validity may be strongly dependent on the number of considered in-
stances of the potential applications of a given rule, and Ross does not
make precise (because such a precisification would always be arbitra-
ry) what this number ought to be. It seems therefore that Ross does
not satisfactorily solve the problem of how to ascertain the probabili-
stic values of assertions about legal validity.
(The objection of the normative insignificance of probabilistic infor-
mation) In assuming the view that assertions about legal validity are
themselves probabilistic, Ross gets entangled in the following difficul-
ty: given that he does not differentiate the binding force of rules on
the basis of their different degrees of validity (i.e., he does not claim
that a rule R whose degree of validity is smaller than that of a rule S
is less binding, and thereby establishing a weaker duty), the very
idea of a probabilistic validity appears to have no normative signifi-
cance. In other words, irrespective of whether given rules have a de-
gree of validity close to 1, or close to (but different from) 0 (i.e., irre-
spective of whether they are, to use Rosss phrase, a strong basis for
predictions or not), they are equally binding for the citizens, i.e., citi-
zens have an equal (absolute or prima facie) duty to obey them. To be
quite strict, Ross contented that legal rules are directed to judges, not
to citizens2, but this limitation of the application of legal rules seems
entirely arbitrary. However, the acceptance of this limitation does not
weaken our objection, because also judges, when applying a legal rule
2 Cf. the following quotation: The real content of a norm of conduct is a direc-
tive to the judge, while the instruction to the private individual is a derived and
figurative norm deduced from it (Ross A. op. cit. 33).
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must treat it as a non-gradable concept: the very fact that some norms
are a less reliable basis for prediction (i.e., their validity is of a smaller
degree) will be of no importance for their decisions. Thus, while cha-
racterizing a given rule from the side of its validity, we can drop from
our description the information about the degree of their probability,
since it has no normative significance. The probability of a given ru-
les being applied may have of course importance for the decision of
the Holmesian Bad Man as to whether comply or not with this rule.
But, let us repeat the main point of our objection: the information
about probability does not carry any significant normative content. It
might have such a content only if one could determine some minimal
threshold of probability dividing rules into valid and non-valid but
it is clear that there are no non-arbitrary criteria of rationality for
making such a determination3.
It may be worthwhile comparing this objection to Harts famous
critique of Rosss conception of validity. Hart argued that if legal ru-
les are what Ross takes them to be, viz. predictions of judges behavior
and their motivation feelings, they cannot guide judges decisions; such
a conception, in Harts view, cannot make sense of the meaning of
judgment of legal validity in the mouth of a judge who is not engaged
in predicting his own or others behavior or feelings; and he added:
This is a valid rule said by a judge is an act of recognition; in saying
it he recognizes the rule in question as one satisfying certain accepted
general criteria for admission as a rule of the system and so as a legal
standard of behavior (Hart Herbert Lionel Adolphus. 1959. Scandi-
navian Realism. Cambridge Law Journal: 235). The core of Harts
argument is that legal rules, as understood by Ross, cannot guide ju-
dicial behavior. The argument correctly points at the paradoxical con-
sequence of Rosss assumption that the empirical content of asser-
tions about legal validity (i.e. predictions of judges behavior and their
motivational feelings) constitutes their meaning. But it omits Rosss
important distinction between doctrinal and non-doctrinal assertions
about valid law: the latter are not regarded by Ross as predictions of
judicial decisions; and it is precisely the latter which, according to
Ross, are supposed to guide judges decisions. But this distinction does
3 Cf, e.g., Grabowski Andrzej, 2014. Juristic Concept of the Validity of Statutory
Law: A Critique of Contemporary Legal Nonpositivism. Heidelberg, New York,
Dordrecht, London: Springer, Ch. 7, section 5.
255Critical Remarks on Alf Rosss Probabilistic Concept of Validity
not seem to safeguard Rosss conception from our objection (arguably
weaker than Harts), since, if his probabilistic concept of validity is to
have any clear meaning, it should apply both to doctrinal assertions
about legal rules and to the rules themselves.
(The objection of neglecting the normativity of legal rules). The
empirical conception of normativity neglects its normative aspect.
However complex will be the way in which we characterize these facts,
it will not be possible to derive from them any reason why the rules
ought to be treated as normatively binding. Ross might reply that
normativity in this  strong sense  as distinct from the psychological
facts concerning the judges motivational feelings is a fictitious no-
tion. But this consequence is inconsistent with the arguably widespread
intuitions that normativity of legal rules cannot be reduced to judges
convictions or motivational feelings.
Let us summarize our critique. We have argued that the very con-
cept of a probabilistic validity may be both non-free-standing, as it
presupposes the non-gradable concept of validity, and indetermina-
ble, as it generates the problem of ascertaining probabilistic values.
But, as we have demonstrated, even if one assumes that probabilistic
concept of validity is both free-standing and determinable, one can
still formulate against it two other strong objections. Firstly, the pro-
babilistic information lacks normative significance: the degree d to
which a given rule is valid, provided only that this degree is contained
in the interval 0 > d <1, has no consequences for the normative force
of this rule. Secondly, Rosss contention that doctrinal assertions abo-
ut legal validity are empirical  sociological and psychological  state-
ments amounts to neglecting the normative aspect of the concept of
validity: the mere empirical fact that a given rule is applied by judges
and treated by them as binding does not explain why this rule ought
to be treated as normatively binding, i.e., as possessing a normative
aspect. The fact that Rosss theory does not account for the normative
aspect of legal rules is a simple consequence of his his neo-positivist
assumption that the meaning of assertions about legal validity are
their empirical consequences, i.e. empirical predictions formulated on
their basis. However, it seems that, contrary to what Ross maintains,
predictions of judicial behaviour formulated on the basis of rules are
not conceptually linked to their validity (i.e., they do not define the
meaning of doctrinal assertions about legal validity); they are merely
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a way of testing empirical hypotheses concerning the application (ef-
fectiveness) of legal rules. Accordingly, (successful) predictions based
on a given rule do not show that a given rule is valid (to a high degree)
but, simply, that it is usually applied by the judges, i.e., that it is effec-
tive. All in all, Rosss account of validity, though prima facie plausible
in its emphasis on the relevance of the recognition by the courts to
legal validity, encounters, on closer examination, serious, perhaps in-
superable, difficulties.
At the end we would like to emphasize that our critique of a proba-
bilistic concept of validity does not apply to all gradable concepts the-
reof. It refers solely to its empirical variety, which is based on the
assumption that assertions about legal validity refer to empirical facts.
A different variety of this concept is the typological one, which formu-
lates certain general features of validity that may be fulfilled to a smal-
ler or lesser degree, and that do not constitute necessary and suffi-
cient conditions of legal validity (an example of this concept is Lon L.
Fullers conception of the inner morality of law). However, a discus-
sion about this kind of non-empirical, gradable concepts of validity
lies beyond the scope of this paper.
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Krytyczne uwagi o teorii obowi„zywania jako pojŒcia probabilistycznego
Alfa Rossa
Streszczenie
Na gruncie dominuj„cego stanowiska pozytywistycznego pojŒcie obowi„zywania
prawa traktowane jest jako niestopniowalne: regu‡a prawna b„d obowi„zuje, b„d
nie obowi„zuje. Jednak taka koncepcja obowi„zywania krytykowana jest przez nie-
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których badaczy za nadmierny rygoryzm i sztywnoæ. Z pozoru atrakcyjn„ alterna-
tyw„ mog‡aby byæ zaproponowana przez Alfa Rossa teoria obowi„zywania jako
pojŒcia probabilistycznego. Ross zak‡ada‡, ¿e im silniejsze predykcje odnonie do
przysz‡ych decyzji sŒdziowskich generuje regu‡a, tym wy¿sze prawdopodobieæstwo
mo¿na przypisaæ jej obowi„zywaniu. Taka koncepcja nie jest jednak wolna od kon-
trowersji. W niniejszym artykule sformu‡owane zosta‡y przeciw niej cztery zarzu-
ty: zarzut pozornej stopniowalnoci, zarzut problematycznej stwierdzalnoci, za-
rzut normatywnej b‡ahoci probabilistycznej informacji i zarzut zaniedbywania
normatywnoci regu‡ prawnych. Zarzuty te traktowane s„ w poni¿szym tekcie
jako stanowi„ce silne podstawy dla odrzucenia twierdzenia Rossa, ¿e predykcje
zachowaæ sŒdziowskich sformu‡owane na podstawie regu‡ s„ pojŒciowo powi„zane
z ich obowi„zywaniem (tj. definiuj„ ich znaczenie); broniona jest teza, ¿e s„ one
jedynie sposobem testowania empirycznych hipotez dotycz„cych stosowania (efek-
tywnoci) regu‡ prawnych.
S‡owa kluczowe: obowi„zywanie, prawdopodobieæstwo, predykcja, ideologia nor-
matywna
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Summary
The concept of legal validity is regarded within the dominant  legal-positivistic 
account of law as a non-gradable concept: a legal rule is either valid or non-valid.
However, this account of validity is criticized by some scholars for being too strict
and rigid. Apparently, an attractive alternative might be Alf Rosss account of va-
lidity as a probabilistic concept. Ross assumed that the stronger predictions of
judicial behavior a given rule generates, the higher probability can be assigned to
its being valid. However, this account of legal validity is by no means uncontrover-
sial. In the paper four objections against it are formulated: the objection of the
apparent gradability, the objection of the problematic ascertainability, the objec-
tion of the normative insignificance of the probabilistic information, and the objec-
tion of neglecting the normativity of legal rules. These objections are treated in the
paper as providing strong reasons for rejecting Rosss claim that predictions of
judicial behaviour formulated on the basis of rules are conceptually linked to their
validity (i.e., they define their meaning); it is argued in the paper that they are
merely a way of testing empirical hypotheses concerning the application (effective-
ness) of legal rules.
Key words: validity, probability, prediction, normative ideology
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